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Abstract. Population protocols have been introduced as a model of
sensor networks consisting of very limited mobile agents with no control
over their own movement: A collection of anonymous agents, modeled by
ﬁnite automata, interact in pairs according to some rules.
Predicates on the initial conﬁgurations that can be computed by such
protocols have been characterized under several hypotheses.
We discuss here whether and when the rules of interactions between
agents can be seen as a game from game theory. We do so by discussing
several basic protocols.
1 Introduction
The computational power of networks of anonymous resource-limited mobile
agents has been investigated in several recent papers.
In particular, Angluin et al. proposed in [1] a new model of distributed com-
putations. In this model, called population protocols, ﬁnitely many ﬁnite-state
agents interact in pairs chosen by an adversary. Each interaction has the eﬀect
of updating the state of the two agents according to a joint transition function.
A protocol is said to (stably) compute a predicate on the initial states of the
agents if, in any fair execution, after ﬁnitely many interactions, all agents reach
a common output that corresponds to the value of the predicate.
The model was originally proposed to model computations realized by sensor
networks in which passive agents are carried along by other entities. The canon-
ical example of [1] corresponds to sensors attached to a ﬂock of birds and that
must be programmed to check some global properties, like determining whether
more than 5% of the population has elevated temperature. Motivating scenarios
also include models of the propagation of trust [8].
? This work and all authors were partly supported by ANR Project SOGEA and by
ANR Project SHAMANMuch of the work so far on population protocols has concentrated on char-
acterizing which predicates on the initial states can be computed in diﬀerent
variants of the model and under various assumptions. In particular, the pred-
icates computable by the unrestricted population protocols from [1] have been
characterized as being precisely the semi-linear predicates, that is to say those
predicates on counts of input agents deﬁnable in ﬁrst-order Presburger arith-
metic [18]. Semilinearity was shown to be suﬃcient in [1] and necessary in [2].
Variants considered so far include restriction to one-way communications,
restriction to particular interaction graphs, to random interactions, with possibly
various kind of failures of agents. Solutions to classical problems of distributed
algorithmics have also been considered in this models. Refer to survey [3] for a
complete discussion.
The population protocol model shares many features with other models al-
ready considered in literature. In particular, models of pairwise interactions have
been used to study the the propagation of diseases [12], or rumors [7]. In chem-
istry the chemical master equation has been justiﬁed using (stochastic) pairwise
interactions between the ﬁnitely many molecules in presence [16,11]. In that
sense, the model of population protocols may be considered as fundamental in
several ﬁelds of study.
Pairwise interactions between ﬁnite-state agents are sometimes motivated by
the study of the dynamics of particular two-players games from game theory. For
example, paper [9] considers the dynamics of the so-called PAV LOV behaviour
in iterated prisoner lemma. Several results about the time of convergence of this
particular dynamics towards the stable state can be found in [9], and [10], for
rings, and complete graphs.
The purpose of the following discussion is to better understand whether and
when pairwise interactions, and hence population protocols, can be considered
as the result of a game. We want to understand if restricting to rules that come
from a (symmetric) game is a limitation, and in particular whether restricting
to rules that can be termed PAV LOV in the spirit of [9] is a limitation.
We do so by giving solutions to several basic problems using rules of interac-
tions associated to a symmetric game. As such protocols must also be symmetric,
we are also discussing whether restricting to symmetric rules in population pro-
tocols is a limitation.
In Section 2, we recall brieﬂy population protocols. In Section 3, we recall
some basics from game theory. In Section 4, we discuss how a game can be turned
into a dynamics, and introduce the notion of Pavlovian population protocol. In
Section 5 we prove that any symmetric deterministic 2-states population protocol
is Pavlovian, and that the problem of computing the OR, AND, as well as the
leader election and majority problem admit Pavlovian solutions. We then discuss
our results in Section 6.2 Population Protocols
A protocol is given by (Q,Σ,ι,ω,δ) with the following components. Q is a ﬁnite
set of states. Σ is a ﬁnite set of input symbols. ι : Σ → Q is the initial state
mapping, and ω : Q → {0,1} is the individual output function. δ ⊆ Q4 is a
joint transition relation that describes how pairs of agents can interact. Relation
δ is sometimes described by listing all possible interactions using the notation
(q1,q2) → (q0
1,q0
2), or even the notation q1q2 → q0
1q0
2, for (q1,q2,q0
1,q0
2) ∈ δ (with
the convention that (q1,q2) → (q1,q2) when no rule is speciﬁed with (q1,q2) in
the left hand side). The protocol is termed deterministic if for all pair (q1,q2)
there is only one pair (q0
1,q0
2) with (q1,q2) → (q0
1,q0
2). In that case, we write
δ1(q1,q2) for the unique q0
1 and δ2(q1,q2) for the unique q0
2.
Notice that, in general, rules can be non-symmetric: whenever (q1,q2) →
(q0
1,q0
2), not necessarily (q2,q1) → (q0
2,q0
1).
Computations of a protocol proceed in the following way. The computation
takes place among n agents, where n ≥ 2. A conﬁguration of the system can
be described by a vector of all the agents’ states. The state of each agent is an
element of Q. Because agents with the same states are indistinguishable, each
conﬁguration can be summarized as an unordered multiset of states, and hence
of elements of Q.
Each agent is given initially some input value from Σ: Each agent’s initial
state is determined by applying ι to its input value. This determines the initial
conﬁguration of the population.
An execution of a protocol proceeds from the initial conﬁguration by inter-
actions between pairs of agents. Suppose that two agents in state q1 and q2 meet
and have an interaction. They can change into state q0
1 and q0
2 if (q1,q2,q0
1,q0
2) is
in the transition relation δ. If C and C0 are two conﬁgurations, we write C → C0
if C0 can be obtained from C by a single interaction of two agents: this means
that C contains two states q1 and q2 and C0 is obtained by replacing q1 and q2
by q0
1 and q0
2 in C, where (q1,q2,q0
1,q0
2) ∈ δ. An execution of the protocol is an
inﬁnite sequence of conﬁgurations C0,C1,C2,···, where C0 is an initial conﬁgu-
ration and Ci → Ci+1 for all i ≥ 0. An execution is fair if for all conﬁguration C
that appears inﬁnitely often in the execution, if C → C0 for some conﬁguration
C0, then C0 appears inﬁnitely often in the execution.
At any point during an execution, each agent’s state determines its output
at that time. If the agent is in state q, its output value is ω(q). The conﬁguration
output is 0 (respectively 1) if all the individual outputs are 0 (respectively 1). If
the individual outputs are mixed 0s and 1s then the output of the conﬁguration
is undeﬁned.
Let p be a predicate over multisets of elements of Σ. Predicate p can be con-
sidered as a function whose range is {0,1} and whose domain is the collection
of these multisets. The predicate is said to be computed by the protocol if, for
every multiset I, and every fair execution that starts from the initial conﬁgura-
tion corresponding to I, the output value of every agent eventually stabilizes to
p(I).
The following was proved in [1,2]Theorem 1 ([1,2]). A predicate is computable in the population protocol model
if and only if it is semilinear.
Recall that semilinear sets are known to correspond to predicates on counts
of input agents deﬁnable in ﬁrst-order Presburger arithmetic [18].
3 Game Theory
We now recall the simplest concepts from Game Theory. We focus on non-
cooperative games, with complete information, in extensive form.
The simplest game is made of two-players, called I and II, with a ﬁnite
set of options, called pure strategies, Strat(I) and Strat(II). Denote by Ai,j
(respectively: Bi,j) the score for player I (resp. II) when I uses strategy i ∈
Strat(I) and II strategy j ∈ Strat(II).
The scores are given by n × m matrices A and B, where n and m are the
cardinality of Strat(I) and Strat(II). The game is termed symmetric if A is
the transpose of B: this implies that n = m, and we can assume without loss of
generality that Strat(I) = Strat(II).
Example 1 (Prisonner dilemma). The case where A and B are the following
matrices
A =

R S
T P

,B =

R T
S P

with T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S, is called the prisoner dilemma. We
denote by C (for cooperation) the ﬁrst pure strategy, and by D (for defection)
the second pure strategy of each player.
As the game is symmetric, matrix A and B can also be denoted by:
Opponent
C D
Player
C R S
D T P
A strategy x ∈ Strat(I) is said to be a best response to strategy y ∈
Strat(II), denoted by x ∈ BR(y) if
Az,y ≤ Ax,y (1)
for all strategy z ∈ Strat(I).
A pair (x,y) is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if x ∈ BR(y) and y ∈ BR(x). A
pure Nash equilibrium does not always exist.
In other words, two strategies (x,y) form a Nash equilibrium if in that state
none of the player has a unilateral interest to deviate from it.Example 2. On the example of the prisoner dilemma, BR(y) = D for all y,
and BR(x) = D for all x. So (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium, and it
is pure. In it, each player has score P. The paradox is that if they had played
(C,C) (cooperation) they would have had score R, that is more. The social
optimal (C,C), is diﬀerent from the equilibrium that is reached by rational
players (D,D), since in any other state, each players fears that the adversary
plays C.
We will also introduce the following deﬁnition: Given some strategy x0 ∈
Strat(I), a strategy x ∈ Strat(I) is said to be a best response to strategy
y ∈ Strat(II) among those diﬀerent from x0, denoted by x ∈ BR6=x0(y) if
Az,y ≤ Ax,y (2)
for all strategy z ∈ Strat(I),z 6= x0.
Of course, the role of II and I can be inverted in previous deﬁnition.
There are two main approaches to discuss dynamics of games. The ﬁrst con-
sists in repeating games. The second in using models from evolutionary game
theory. Refer to [13,19] for a presentation of this latter approach.
Repeating Games. Repeating k times a game, is equivalent to extend the space
of choices into Strat(I)k and Strat(II)k: player I (respectively II) chooses its
action x(t) ∈ Strat(I), (resp. y(t) ∈ Strat(II)) at time t for t = 1,2,··· ,k.
Hence, this is equivalent to a two-players game with respectively nk and mk
choices for players.
To avoid confusions, we will call actions the choices x(t),y(t) of each player
at a given time, and strategies the sequences X = x(1),··· ,x(k) and Y =
y(1),··· ,y(k), that is to say the strategies for the global game.
If the game is repeated an inﬁnite number of times, a strategy becomes a
function from integers to the set of actions, and the game is still equivalent to a
two-players game1.
Behaviors. In practice, player I (respectively II) has to solve the following
problem at each time t: given the history of the game up to now, that is to say
Xt−1 = x(1),··· ,x(t − 1)
and
Yt−1 = y(1),··· ,y(t − 1)
what should I play at time t? In other words, how to choose x(t) ∈ Strat(I)?
(resp. y(t) ∈ Strat(II)?)
This is natural to suppose that this is given by some behavior rules:
x(t) = f(Xt−1,Yt−1),
y(t) = g(Xt−1,Yt−1)
for some particular functions f and g.
1 but whose matrices are inﬁnite.The Speciﬁc Case of the Prisoner Lemma. The question of the best behavior rule
to use for the prisoner lemma gave birth to an important literature. In particular,
after the book [4], that describes the results of tournaments of behavior rules for
the iterated prisoner lemma, and that argues that there exists a best behavior
rule called TIT − FOR − TAT. This consists in cooperating at the ﬁrst step,
and then do the same thing as the adversary at following times.
A lot of other behaviors, most of them with very picturesque names have
been proposed and studied: see for example [4], [5], [15].
Among possible behaviors is PAV LOV : in the iterated prisoner lemma, a
player cooperates if and only if both players opted from the same alternative in
the previous move. This name [14,17,4] stems from the fact that this strategy
embodies an almost reﬂex-like response to the payoﬀ: it repeats its former move
if it was rewarded by R or T points, but switches behavior if it was punished by
receiving only P or S points. Refer to [17] for some study of this strategy in the
spirit of Axelrod’s tournaments.
The PAV LOV behavior can also be termed WIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT as
if the play on the previous round resulted in a success, then the agent plays the
same strategy on the next round. Alternatively, if the play resulted in a failure
the agent switches to another action [17,4].
Going From 2 Players to N Players. PAV LOV behavior is Markovian: a be-
havior f is Markovian, if f(Xt−1,Yt−1) depends only on x(t − 1) and y(t − 1).
From such a behavior, this is easy to obtain a distributed dynamic. For
example, let’s follow [9], for the prisoner dilemma.
Suppose that we have a connected graph G = (V,E), with N vertices. The
vertices correspond to players. An instantaneous conﬁguration of the system is
given by an element of {C,D}N, that is to say by the state C or D of each
vertex. Hence, there are 2N conﬁgurations.
At each time t, one chooses randomly and uniformly one edge (i,j) of the
graph. At this moment, players i and j play the prisoner dilemma with the
PAV LOV behavior. This is easy to see that this corresponds to executing the
following rules:

  
  
CC → CC
CD → DD
DC → DD
DD → CC.
(3)
What is the ﬁnal state reached by the system? The underlying model is a
huge Markov chain with 2N states. The state E∗ = {C}N is absorbing. If the
graph G does not have any isolated vertex, this is the unique absorbing state, and
there exists a sequence of transformations that transforms any state E into this
state E∗. As a consequence, from well-known classical results in Markov chain
theory, whatever the initial conﬁguration is, with probability 1, the system will
eventually be in state E∗ [6]. The system is self-stabilizing.
Several results about the time of convergence towards this stable state can
be found in [9], and [10], for rings, and complete graphs.What is interesting in this example is that it shows how to go from a game,
and a behavior to a distributed dynamic on a graph, and in particular to a
population protocol when the graph is the complete graph.
4 From Games To Population Protocols
In the spirit of previous discussion, to any symmetric game, we can associate a
population protocol as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Associating a Protocol to a Game). Assume a symmetric
two-players game is given. Let ∆ be some threshold.
The protocol associated to the game is a population protocol whose set of
states is Q, where Q = Strat(I) = Strat(II) is the set of strategies of the game,
and whose transition rules δ are given as follows:
(q1,q2,q0
1,q0
2) ∈ δ
whenever
– q0
1 = q1 when Mq1,q2 ≥ ∆
– q0
1 ∈ BR6=q1(q2) when Mq1,q2 < ∆
and
– q0
2 = q2 when Mq2,q1 ≥ ∆
– q0
2 ∈ BR6=q2(q1) when Mq2,q1 < ∆,
where M is the matrix of the game.
Deﬁnition 2 (Pavlovian Population Protocol). A population protocol is
Pavlovian if it can be obtained from a game as above.
Remark 1. Clearly a Pavlovian population protocol must be symmetric: indeed,
whenever (q1,q2,q0
1,q0
2) ∈ δ, one has (q2,q1,q0
2,q0
1) ∈ δ.
5 Some Speciﬁc Pavlovian Protocols
We now discuss whether assuming protocols Pavlovian is a restriction.
We start by an easy consideration.
Theorem 2. Any symmetric deterministic 2-states population protocol is Pavlo-
vian.
Proof. Consider a deterministic symmetric 2-states population protocol. Note
Q = {+,−} its set of states. Its transition function can be written as follows:

  
  
+ + → α++α++
+ − → α+−α−+
− + → α−+α+−
− − → α−−α−−
(4)for some α++,α+−,α−+,α−−.
This corresponds to the symmetric game given by the following pay-oﬀ matrix
M
Opponent
+ -
Player
+ β++ β+−
- β−+ β−−
taking threshold ∆ = 1, where for all q1,q2 ∈ {+,−},
– βq1q2 = 2 if αq1q2 = q1,
– βq1q2 = 0 otherwise.
Unfortunately, not all rules correspond to a game.
Proposition 1. Some symmetric population protocols are not Pavlovian.
Proof. Indeed, consider for example a deterministic 3-states population protocol
with set of states Q = {q0,q1,q2} and a joint transition function δ such that
δ1(q0,q0) = q1, δ1(q1,q0) = q2 , δ1(q2,q0) = q0.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a 2-players game corresponding to
this 3-states population protocol. Consider its payoﬀ matrix M. Let M(q0,q0) =
β0, M(q1,q0) = β1 , M(q2,q0) = β2. We must have β0 ≥ ∆,β1 ≥ ∆ and β0 ≥ ∆
since all agents that interact with an agent in state q0 must change their state.
Now, since q0 changes to q1, q1 must be a strictly best response to q0 than
q2: hence, we must have β1 > β2. In a similar way, since q1 changes to q2, we
must have β2 > β0 , and since q2 changes to q0, we must have β0 > β1. From
β1 > β2 > β0 we reach a contradiction.
This indeed motivates the following study, where we discuss which problems
admit a Pavlovian solution.
5.1 Basic Protocols
Proposition 2. There is a Pavlovian protocol that computes the logical OR
(resp. AND) of input bits.
Proof. Consider the following protocol to compute OR,

  
  
01 → 11
10 → 11
00 → 00
11 → 11
(5)
and the following protocol to compute AND,
  
  
01 → 00
10 → 00
00 → 00
11 → 11
(6)
Since they are both deterministic 2-states population protocols, they are
Pavlovian.
Remark 2. Notice that OR (respectively AND) protocol corresponds to the
predicates on counts of input agents n0 ≥ 1 (resp. n1 = 0) where n0, n1 are
the number of input agents in state 0 and 1 respectively.
Remark 3. Previous protocols are“naturally broadcasting”: eventually all agents
agree on some (the correct) value. With previous deﬁnitions (which are the
classical ones for population protocols), the following protocol, does not compute
the XOR or input bits, or if ones prefers does not compute predicate n1 ≡
1 (mod 2). 
  
  
01 → 01
10 → 10
00 → 00
11 → 00
(7)
Indeed, the answer is not eventually known by all the agents. It computes
the XOR in a weaker form: eventually, all agents will be in state 0, if the XOR
of input bits is 0, or eventually only one agent will be in state 1, if the XOR of
input bits is 1.
5.2 Leader Election
The classical solution [1] to the leader election problem (starting from a conﬁgu-
ration with ≥ 1 leaders, eventually exactly one leader survives) is the following:

  
  
LL → LN
LN → LN
NL → NL
NN → NN
(8)
Unfortunately, this protocol is non-symmetric, and hence non-Pavlovian.
Remark 4. Actually, the problem is with the ﬁrst rule, since one wants two lead-
ers to become only one. If the two leaders are identical, this is clearly problematic
with symmetric rules.
However, the leader election problem can actually be solved by a Pavlovian
protocol, at the price of a less trivial protocol.Proposition 3. The following Pavlovian protocol solves the leader election prob-
lem, as soon as the population is of size ≥ 3.

            
            
L1L2 → L1N
L1N → NL2
L2N → NL1
NN → NN
L2L1 → NL1
NL1 → L2N
NL2 → L1N
L1L1 → L2L2
L2L2 → L1L1
(9)
Proof. Indeed, starting from a conﬁguration containing not only Ns, eventually
after some time conﬁgurations will have exactly one leader, that is one agent in
state L1 or L2.
Indeed, the ﬁrst rule and the ﬁfth rule decrease strictly the number of leaders
whenever there are more than two leaders. Now the other rules, preserve the
number of leaders, and are made such that a L1 can always be transformed into
a L2 and vice-versa, and hence are made such that a conﬁguration where ﬁrst
or ﬁfth rule applies can always be reached whenever there are more than two
leaders. The fact that it solves the leader election problem then follows from the
hypothesis of fairness in the deﬁnition of computations.
This is a Pavlovian protocol, since it corresponds to the following payoﬀ
matrix, with threshold ∆ = 4
Opponent
L1 L2 N
Player
L1 1 4 1
L2 3 1 1
N 2 1 4
5.3 Majority
Proposition 4. The majority problem (given some population of 0s and 1s,
determine whether there are more 0s than 1s) can be solved by a Pavlovian pop-
ulation protocol.
If one prefers, the predicate n0 ≥ n1 on counts of input agents can be com-
puted by a Pavlovian population protocol.
Proof. We claim that the following protocol outputs 1 if there are more 0s than
1s in the initial conﬁguration and 0 otherwise,
          
          
NY → Y Y
Y N → Y Y
N0 → Y 0
0N → 0Y
Y 1 → N1
1Y → 1N
01 → NY
10 → Y N
(10)
taking
– Σ = {0,1},Q = {0,1,Y,N},
– ω(0) = ω(Y ) = 1,
– ω(1) = ω(N) = 0.
In this protocol, the states Y and N are“neutral”elements for our predicate
but they should be understood as Yes and No. They are the “answers” to the
question: are there more 0s than 1s.
This protocol is made such that the number of 0 and 1s is preserved ex-
cept when a 0 meets a 1. In that latter case, the two agents are deleted and
transformed into a Y and a N.
If there are initially strictly more 0s than 1s, from the fairness condition,
each 1 will be paired with a 0 and at some point no 1 will left. By fairness and
since there is still at least an 0, a conﬁguration containing only 0 and Y s will
be reached. Since in such a conﬁguration, no rule can modify the state of any
agent, and since the output is deﬁned and equals to 1 in such a conﬁguration,
the protocol is correct in this case
By symmetry, one can show that the protocol outputs 0 if there are initially
strictly more 1s than 0s.
Suppose now that initially, there are exactly the same number of 0s and 1s.
By fairness, there exists a step when no more agents in the state 0 or 1 left.
Note that at the moment where the last 0 is matched with the last 1, a Y is
created. Since this Y can be“broadcasted”over the Ns, in the ﬁnal conﬁguration
all agents are in the state Y and thus the output is correct.
This protocol is Pavlovian, since it corresponds to the following payoﬀ matrix
with threshold 2.
Opponent
N Y 0 1
N 3 1 1 3
Player Y 2 3 3 1
0 2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 26 Discussions
We proved that predicates on counts of input agents n ≥ 0, n = 0, n ≥ m,
where n,m are some counts of input agents, can be computed by some Pavlovian
population protocols.
This is clear that the subset of the predicates computable by Pavlovian pop-
ulation protocols is closed by negation: just switch the value of the individual
output function of a protocol computing a predicate to get a protocol computing
its negation.
However, some work remains to fully characterize which predicates can be
computed by a Pavlovian population protocol. First steps would be to under-
stand the following questions.
Question 1. Is mod 2, of if ones prefers the predicate n ≡ 1 (mod 2), computable
by a Pavlovian population protocol?
Question 2. Is ≥ k, of if ones prefers the predicate n ≥ k, for ﬁxed k, computable
by a Pavlovian population protocol?
Notice that, unlike what happens for general population protocols, composing
Pavlovian population protocols into a Pavlovian population protocol is not easy.
This is hence also not clear that Pavlovian computable predicates are closed by
conjunctions: classical constructions for general population protocols can not be
used directly.
As we said, Pavlovian Population protocols are symmetric. We however know
that assuming population protocols symmetric is not a restriction.
Proposition 5. Any population protocol can be simulated by a symmetric pop-
ulation protocol, as soon as the population is of size ≥ 3.
Before proving this proposition, we state the (immediate) main consequence.
Corollary 1. A predicate is computable by a symmetric population protocol if
and only if it is semilinear.
Proof (of proposition). To a population protocol (Q,Σ,ι,ω,δ), with Q = {q1,··· ,qn}
associate population protocol (Q∪Q0,Σ,ι,ω,δ0) with Q0 = {q0
1,··· ,q0
n}, ω(q0) =
ω(q) for all q ∈ Q, and for all rule
qq → αβ
in δ, the following rules in δ0:

          
          
qq0 → αβ
q0q → βα
qq → q0q0
q0q0 → qq
qγ → q0γ
q0γ → qγ
γq → γq0
γq0 → γqfor all γ ∈ Q ∪ Q0,γ 6= q,γ 6= q0, and for all pairs of rules

qr → αβ
rq → δ
with q,r ∈ Q, the following rules in δ0:

  
  
qr0 → αβ
r0q → βα
rq0 → δ
q0r → δ.
The obtained population protocol is clearly symmetric. Now the ﬁrst set of rules
guarantees that a state in Q can always be converted in its primed version in Q0
and vice-versa. By fairness, whenever a rule qq → αβ (respectively qr → αβ) can
be applied, then the corresponding two ﬁrst rules of the ﬁrst set of rules (resp. of
the second set of rules) can eventually be ﬁred after possibly some conversions
of states into their primed version or vice-versa.
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